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Abstract: Allocating the fixed cost among a set of users in a fair way is an important 
issue both in management and economic research. Recently, Du et al. (2014) proposed 
a novel approach for allocating the fixed cost based on the game cross-efficiency 
method by taking the game relations among users in efficiency evaluation. This paper 
proves that the novel approach of Du et al. (2014) is equivalent to the efficiency 
maximization approach of Li et al. (2013), and may exist multiple optimal cost 
allocation plans. Taking into account the game relations in the allocation process, this 
paper proposes a cooperative game approach, and uses the nucleolus as a solution to 
the proposed cooperative game. The proposed approach in this paper is illustrated 
with a dataset from the prior literature and a real dataset of a steel and iron enterprise 
in China. 
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1. Introduction 
The fixed cost, which refers to the expense of building a common platform by an 
organization for its subunits (Li et al., 2009), frequently appears in real applications 
such as the advertisement expenditure of a manufacturer across its retailers (Cook and 
Kress, 1999), the transportation cost within a global supply chain (Vidal and 
Goetschalckx, 2001), and the cost of a common communication cable among its users 
(Beasley, 2003). A natural question arises about how to allocate the fixed cost of a 
common platform among its various users in an equitable manner. 
Recently, data envelopment analysis (DEA), which is a classical non-parametric 
mathematical programming approach for relative efficiency evaluation (An et al., 
2018; Li et al., 2018a, 2018ff; Wu et al., 2018), becomes a novel approach in solving 
the fixed cost allocation problem for it has several advantages (Si et al., 2013). First, 
DEA can successfully address multiple attributes (inputs and outputs), and the fixed 
cost allocation problem always refers to multiple attribute decision making problems. 
Second, the common platform’s users (called as decision making units or “DMUs” in 
DEA) are independent, homogeneous, and comparable, which satisfies the 
requirement of homogeneity of DMUs in applying DEA to approach the fixed cost 
allocation problem (Dyson et al., 2001; Li et al., 2009). Third, DEA provides decision 
makers (DMs) the possibility to consider the effect of feasible allocation plans on 
performance evaluation (Li et al., 2009). 
DEA-based fixed cost allocation approaches in literature can be divided into three 
categories. The first is based on the principle of efficiency-invariance, which assumes 
that the post-allocation efficiency of each DMU should be the same as its 
pre-allocation efficiency. Cook and Kress (1999) first propose this principle in 
allocating the fixed cost and develop several linear programs to obtain an equitable 
allocation. In order to obtain a unique cost allocation, some additional weight 
constraints such as the cone ratios (Charnes et al., 1989, 1990) may be added to these 
linear programs. Later, the approach of Cook and Kress (1999) is extended by 
Jahanshahloo et al. (2004), Cook and Zhu (2005), Lin (2011a, b) and Mostafaee 
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(2013). Recently, Lin et al. (2016) proposed a new proportional sharing method for 
allocating the fixed cost based on two assumptions of efficiency invariance and zero 
slack simultaneously. Jahanshahloo et al. (2017) and Li et al. (2017) determined a 
unique allocation plan based on common weights and efficiency invariance principles 
simultaneously. Lin and Chen (2016) extended the efficiency invariance principle to 
super-efficiency situations, and then suggested three models, which guarantee 
piratical feasibility, to allocating a fixed cost as well as allocating a fixed resource 
along with sharing a common output target. However, Beasley (2003) and Li et al. 
(2013) find that the cost allocation based on the efficiency invariance principle may 
be determined entirely by the input side of DMUs, no matter how much difference 
among their outputs. 
The second is the efficiency-maximization approach, which allocates the fixed cost 
based on the principle of maximizing the sum or average of post-allocation 
efficiencies of all DMUs. Beasley (2003) first applies such a novel principle but needs 
solving several non-linear models, and later is developed by Amirteimoori and 
Kordrostami (2005), Fang and Zhang (2008), Li et al. (2009) , Amirteimoori and 
Tabar (2010), Khodabakhshi and Aryavash (2014) and Li et al. (2018d). Li et al. 
(2013) prove that non-linear models of Beasley (2003) can be changed to be linear 
since there exists a common set of weights that makes all DMUs (weakly) efficient, 
and the cost allocations based on the efficiency-maximization principle can be 
represented by a set of equations. Si et al. (2013) prove that the set of equations is the 
same as the traditional proportional sharing approach in one-dimensional case, and 
therefore call the set of equations as the extended proportional sharing approach. Most 
recently, Lin and Chen (2017) studied a situation where the allocated cost is a 
complement to the original inputs. Their approach considered the production level 
from a size point of view and is always feasible under both variable returns to scale 
and constant returns to scale properties. Yu et al. (2016), Zhu et al. (2017) and Li et al. 
(2018b) extended the fixed cost allocation problem to network situations by 
considering the internal two-stage processes, all three methods are implemented under 
the efficiency-maximization assumption. Li et al. (2018e) considered the feasibility of 
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possible allocation plans and suggested a new non-egoistic principle, which states that 
each DMU should propose its allocation proposal in such a way that the maximal cost 
would be allocated to itself. Further, the optimal allocation plan is generated in a way 
that maximizes the efficiency scores for all DMUs. 
The last is the game-based approach which takes into account the game relation 
among DMUs. This game relation can be understood since the less cost one DMU 
afford, the more the others. Nakabayashi and Tone (2006) first address the game 
relation among DMUs and use the cooperative game to solve the “egoist’s dilemma” 
in the fixed cost allocation. Their approach directly defines the allocated cost as a 
ratio between the weighted inputs (outputs) and the weighted overall inputs (outputs), 
and doesn’t take into account the fixed cost in efficiency evaluation of DMUs. Du et 
al. (2014) creatively apply the game cross-efficiency approach to addressing the game 
relation in the efficiency evaluation. The numerical example in Du et al. (2014) shows 
there may exist multiple cost allocations and these cost allocations make all DMUs 
(weakly) efficient, which is similar to the extended proportional sharing approach in 
Li et al. (2013). Li et al. (2018d) propose a DEA-game cross-efficiency approach for 
allocating the fixed cost, where all DMUs focus more on the cross-efficiency 
improvements than the allocated costs. 
These observations motivate us to address two questions as follows:  
1. What is the relation between the game cross-efficiency approach in Du et al. 
(2014) and the extended proportional sharing approach in Li et al. (2013)?  
2. How to take into account the game relation among DMUs in allocating the fixed 
cost when there exist multiple cost allocations? 
This paper first addresses the relation between the two approaches and finds that 
the game cross-efficiency method of Du et al. (2014) is equivalent to the extended 
proportional sharing method of Li et al. (2013). Then, all the feasible cost allocations 
can be represented as the extended proportional sharing equations. Based on the set of 
equations, this paper takes into account the game relation among DMUs, and proposes 
a cooperative game approach to allocate the fixed cost.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the novel 
6 
game cross-efficiency method of Du et al. (2014) and the extended proportional 
sharing method of Li et al. (2013), and then address the relations between the two 
approaches. Section 3 proposes a cooperative game DEA approach to obtain a unique 
fixed cost allocation, and applies the nucleolus as a solution to the cooperative game. 
Section 4 illustrates the proposed approach with two numerical examples, one from 
previous literature and the other a real application from a company in China. 
Conclusions and future research are given in the last section. 
2. Preliminaries 
This section first introduces the classical CCR model (Charnes et al., 1978), the game 
cross-efficiency method from Du et al. (2014) and the extended proportional sharing 
method from Li et al. (2013) and then addresses the relation between the two 
methods. 
2.1. Efficiency measurement taking into account the fixed cost 
Suppose there are n  homogenous DMUs, and each DMU consumes m  inputs to 
produce s  outputs. Denote the input vector and output vector of ( )1,...,jDMU j n=  
as ( )1 ,...,j j mjX x x=  and ( )1 ,...,j j sjY y y= , respectively. The CCR efficiency of 
( )1,..,dDMU d n= can be calculated as follows: 
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Here ,r iu v  are unknown weights attached to the r
th output and the ith input, 
respectively, and the optimal objective function *d  is defined as the CCR efficiency 
score of dDMU .  
Suppose the total fixed cost R should be covered by n  DMUs, and 
( )1,...,jDMU j n=  affords a non-negative cost jR  such that 
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Formula (2) ensures that the sum of allocated fixed costs precisely equals to R, and 
the amount of allocated cost jR  to each ( )1,...,jDMU j n=  ranges from zero to R. 
By taking into account the allocated fixed cost, the post-allocation efficiency of 
( )1,...,dDMU d n=  can be calculated as follows: 
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It is noteworthy that the allocated cost in model (3) is treated as an extra input and 
attached with a positive weight ( 1 0mv +  ). For details on this treatment, readers can 
refer to Beasley (2003).  
Based on the literature review, the first cost allocation approach based on the 
principle of efficiency invariance finds cost allocations which make *d =Ed
*. The 
other two cost allocation approaches are introduced as follows.  
2.2. The game cross-efficiency method 
Based on the game cross-efficiency concept, Du et al. (2014) adjust model (3) as 
follows: 
  
( )* 1
11
1
11
1
1
. . 1,
0,
, , , , ,
s d
r rdr
d m d d d
i id m di
s d
r rjr
j m d d d
i ij m ji
n d
jj
d
j
d d d
r i m
u y
E d Max
v x v R
u y
s t e j
v x v R
R R
R j
u v v r i
=
+=
=
+=
=
+
=
+
  
+
=
 
 




                                  (4) 
The major difference between model (3) and (4) is that model (4) adds a lower 
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bound ej on the efficiency of DMUj. This adjustment can ensure that dDMU  
maximizes its own efficiency score in choosing a cost allocation without reducing 
other DMUs’ efficiency scores. Du et al. (2014) initially set ej=θj* (j=1,2,…, n), 
whereθj* is the CCR efficiency score of DMUj based on model (1). Here,   is a 
sufficiently small positive value and  = 610−  in the numerical example of Du et al. 
(2014). 
Model (4) can be transformed to be a linear programming by the Cooper-Charnes 
transformation such that ( )1 1 111 , , ,
m d d d d d d d d d
i id m d r r i i m mi
v x v R u w v w v    + + += + = = = = , 
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d d d
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  Denoting the optimal solution to model (5) as ( )*dr r  , ( )
*d
iw i , 
*
1
d
mw + , and 
( )*djr j , the d-cross-efficiency for each ( )1,...,jDMU j n=  (Doyle and Green, 1994) 
can be calculated by 
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Then the cross-efficiency for ( )1,...,jDMU j n=  is most commonly calculated as 
the arithmetic mean value of all of its d-cross efficiencies (Doyle and Green, 1994; Li 
et al., 2018c) as follows: 
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  Hence, the algorithm of cross-efficiency iterative method proposed by Du et al. 
(2014) can be summarized as below: 
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Step 1: Solve model (1) and obtain ( )* 1,...,j j n = . Let 
1 *
j j je e = = . 
Step 2: Solve model (5) for each ( )1,...,dDMU d n= . 
Let 
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 where ( )*d tr je , ( )*d ti jw e , and 
( )*d tj jr e  are optimal values of dr , diw , and djr , respectively, when tj je e= . 
Step 3: If 1 ,t tj je e j
+ −   , where   is a pre-specified small enough positive value 
( = 610−  in Du et al. (2014)), then the iterative algorithm terminates. If not, let 
1t
j je e
+=  and go to step 2 again. 
When the iterative algorithm terminates, each ( )1,...,dDMU d n=  gives an 
allocation plan 
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=   is taken as the final fixed cost allocated to ( )1,...,jDMU j n= . 
In addition, the numerical example in Du et al. (2014) shows the optimal 
cross-efficiency for each DMUj equals one and there may exist multiple cost 
allocations. 
2.3. The extended proportional sharing method 
Li et al. (2013) use model (3) to maximize the efficiency of each DMU, and prove 
that there exist some cost allocations which make each DMU’s efficiency be one, 
even based on a common set of weights across all DMUs such that  
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By inserting 1j m jr v R+= , system (8) can be changed to be the following form: 
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The fixed cost allocated to ( )1,...,jDMU j n=  can be denoted as 1j j mR r v += . Li 
et al. (2013) prove that cost allocations based on system (9) can be generated by a 
common set of weights across all DMUs. Si et al. (2013) find that the system (9) in 
the one-dimensional case equals to the standard proportional sharing method, and 
therefore call it as the extended proportional sharing method. 
2.4. Relationship of these two methods 
2.4.1. Equivalence 
This subsection addresses the relations between the game cross-efficiency method of 
Du et al. (2014) and the extended proportional sharing method of Li et al. (2013). 
Here, we introduce two theorems. 
Theorem 1. Each fixed cost allocation under a common set of weights based on 
system (9) can satisfy the algorithm of the game cross-efficiency method. 
Proof: See Appendix 1.  
This theorem shows that there exist efficient fixed cost allocation plans under a 
common set of weights based on system (9) that are also optimal solutions to the 
cross-efficiency iterative procedure. This result is consistent with the connotation of 
common weights, indicating that equal valuations of the input-output measures in the 
reference set (i.e., common weights) can be eventually accepted by all bargainers. 
Further, as Li et al. (2013) indicated that there will be multiple possible allocation 
plans that can satisfy the constraints of system (9), thus there will be also multiple 
allocation plans derived from the cross-efficiency iterative procedure. 
Theorem 2. When the algorithm of the game cross-efficiency method terminates, the 
resulted fixed cost allocation can be generated based on system (9) under a common 
set of weights. 
Proof: See Appendix 2.  
Theorem 2 shows that any fixed cost allocation resulted from the cross-efficiency 
iterative procedure can be realized based on system (9) using a set of common 
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weights. Although DMUs will not necessarily select identical relative weights in the 
cross-efficiency iterative procedure, a common set of weights can be used to replace 
the negotiation results yet without changing the allocation plan derived from the 
cross-efficiency iterative procedure. Hence, using a set of common weights 
automatically realizes the game cross-efficiency equilibrium in the fixed cost 
problem. 
Based on Theorem 1 and 2, a corollary is obtained as follows: 
Corollary 1. The optimal cost allocation of the game cross-efficiency method is 
equivalent to that of the extended proportional sharing method under a common set of 
weights based on system (9). 
Proof: See Appendix 3.  
Corollary 1 shows the equivalence of the two cost allocaiton methods, one is the 
game cross-efficiency method of Du et al. (2014), and the other is the extended 
proportional sharing method of Li et al. (2013). This interesting finding shows (a) the 
efficiency maximization cost allocation approach in fact considers the game relation 
among DMU in efficiency evaluation; and (b) all cost allocations based on the method 
of Du et al. (2014) can be represented as the syetem (9).  
However, Li et al. (2013) show there may exist multiple cost allocations based on 
system (9). Readers can refer to the Appendix 4 for a detail discussion. In this case, 
DMUs still have flexibility of bargainning (game) in allocating the fixed cost. Then, 
the second question arises that how to take into account the game relation among 
DMUs in allocating the fixed cost when there exist multiple cost allocations.  
3. A cooperative game DEA approach 
This section proposes a cooperative game DEA approach to solve the second question. 
The cooperation and competition relations among DMUs exist at the same time. For 
example, DMUs are cooperative in jointly using a common platform rather than set up 
the platform independently, since this cooperative relation can save individual DMUs’ 
costs. And also individual DMUs are competitive to cover the fixed cost. Therefore, 
to address such cooperation and competition relations among DMUs, a cooperative 
game is proposed in this section. 
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Based on the framework of Nakabayashi and Tone (2006) and Lozano (2012), we 
make following assumptions to develop the cooperative game among all DMUs: 
(1) DMUs are generally selfish. This principle implies that each DMU wants to 
minimize its allocated cost (or maximize its profit from our perspective); 
(2) DMUs would like to participate in the grand coalition, and arrive at an equitable 
and acceptable allocation plan ( )1,..., nz z z= . We will demonstrate this point using 
the characteristic function as explained below. 
3.1  Characteristic function 
Let a coalition S be a subset of the player set  1,...,N n= , and its inputs and outputs 
of coalition S are denoted as ( )i idd Sx S x=  and ( )r rdd Sy S y= . We propose 
model (10) to calculate the upper bound of fixed cost allocated to coalition S. 
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We can convert model (10) into a linear programming by setting 
1 1,r r m i i mu v v w v + += = , and 1j j mR r v += . 
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For any coalition NS  , the optimal objective function value ( )C S  of model (11) 
can be regarded as the maximal “psychological price”, since each coalition (or each 
DMU) is selfish to cover the cost share as low as possible. Therefore, the cost share of 
each coalition (DMU) should not be more than the optimal objective function of 
model (11). Here, when the coalition S just has one DMU, we write C({j}) as C(j) for 
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short.  
Based on model (11), we define a characteristic function for the coalition S as 
follows: 
Definition 1: For any subset S N , its characteristic function is defined as 
( ) ( ) ( )
j S
V S C j C S

= − . 
Note ( ) ( )
j S
C j C S

−  denotes the gap between the sum of maximal 
“psychological prices” for individual DMU in S and the corresponding price of the 
coalition S. The more the savings of the cost share of the coalition S, the bigger the 
value of V(S). Therefore, V(S) can be defined as the profit (gain) by forming the 
coalition S. All coalitions aim to maximize their profits. 
The characteristic function V(S) has following properties. 
Proposition 2. ( ) ( ) ( )0,
j N
V V N C j R

 = = − . 
Proof. See Appendix 5.  
Theorem 3. The characteristic function V(S) satisfies the super-additivity such that 
( ) ( ) ( )+V S V T V S T , ,S T N and S T = . 
Proof. See Appendix 6.   
Theorem 3 shows the game (N, V) forms a cooperative game, which have 
nonempty cores (Shapley, 1967) and give stable fixed cost allocations (Lozano, 2012). 
In addition, the game (N, V) is a balanced game as follows: 
Theorem 4. The cooperative game (N, V) is a balanced game. 
Proof. See Appendix 7.  
Thus, the game (N, V) belongs to transferable utility cooperative games. Based on 
the Definition 1, the transferable utility V(S) is the “profit” (or money). The total 
payoff (or profits) of V(S) can be distributed to its members (DMUs) based on several 
famous solutions to the cooperative game. Solutions can be the kernel, core, nucleolus, 
stable set, bargaining set, Shapley value, and so on (Shapley, 1967; Kruś and Bronisz, 
2000; Nakabayashi and Tone, 2006; Lozano, 2012). For details, readers can refer to 
Owen (2013). 
3.2 Nucleolus-based allocation 
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This section takes the nucleolus solution as an example to show how to obtain a fixed 
cost allocation, and other solution-based game allocations can be gotten in a similar 
way. Theoretically, the nucleolus-based game solution always exists and is unique 
(Schmeidler, 1969), which is an important feature for the studied fixed cost allocation 
problem. Suppose the nucleolus-based cost allocation of the cooperative game DEA 
(N, V) be ( )1,..., nz z z= , it should satisfy the following rationalities: 
1) Individual rationality: ( ) ( ) 0,jC j z V j j N−  =   . 
2) Coalition rationality: ( ) ( ) ,jj S j SC j z V S S N −     . 
3) Collective rationality: ( ) ( ) ( )jj N j N j NC j z V N C j R  − = = −   . 
The individual rationality ensures that the generated allocation brings improvement 
in the received profit for each individual DMU. The coalition rationality ensures that 
there exists no coalition that has incentives to quit the grand coalition. Last, the 
collective rationality ensures that all profits are distributed (i.e., the total fixed costs 
are actually allocated). 
Based on the nucleolus solution, we need to give a definition to measure the effect 
of the cost allocation ( )1,..., nz z z=  on the happiness of the coalition S as follows:  
Definition 2: Let ( )1,..., nz z z=  be an imputation for the cooperative game DEA 
( ),N V , and its excess value of coalition S is denoted as 
( ) ( )( ) ( ), jj S j Se S z C j z V S = − −  . 
Based on Definition 1, ( ) ( ), jj Se S z C S z= − , and thus the excess value 
measures the distance from the cost allocation ( )1,..., nz z z=  to the worst result 
( )C S , and reflects the “degree of happiness” of coalition S to the allocation z . The 
larger the excess value, the higher the “degree of happiness”. If we sort the excess 
values of all coalitions ,S N S   in descending order, a vector ( )z  can be 
defined as follows: 
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  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 12 2 2 2,..., , ,..., , ,n nz z z e S z e S z   − −= =  
where ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 2 2, , ... ,ne S z e S z e S z−   . 
  Denote the set of all feasible cost allocations to the cooperative game DEA ( ),N V  
as Z, then the nucleolus is the set of feasible distributions that maximizes ( )z by the 
lexicographic order (Schmeidler, 1969) as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) , .z z Z z y y Z  =                                     (12) 
3.3 Computation algorithm 
To calculate the nucleolus-based allocation, the following max-min model is proposed 
based on the framework of Maschler et al. (1979). 
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1 1
1
,
. . ,
0,
, 0, , .
w S
s m
j r rj i ijr i
n
jj
j
r i
Max mine S z
s t z y w x j
z R
z j
w r i



= =
=
= − 
=
 
 
 
                                 (13) 
  Let ( )min ,
S
e S z = , then the above program can be transformed into a linear one: 
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
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               (14) 
  If we denote the optimal solution to model (14) as ( )* *1 ,j j ,z , then all coalitions 
can be divided into two subsets, 
  ( ) ( ) *1 1= = , , ,jj S j SS C j z V S S N S  − −                    (15) 
  ( ) ( ) *2 1= , , .jj S j SS C j z V S S N S  − −                    (16) 
  Next, we maximize the smallest excess value for 2 . This process is repeated until 
the largest excess values of all coalitions are determined. The final optimal imputation 
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(the final fixed cost allocation) is uniquely given by ( )* ,jz j N  . The computation 
algorithm can be summarized as follows: 
Step 1: Let 1l = . Denote the optimal solution to model (14) as 
( )* * * *1 1 1 1, , , , , ,r i jw z r i j   . Then the corresponding excess value of each coalition can 
be calculated via definition 2. If ( ) *1, =e S z  , then denote the coalition set with the 
same excess value *1  as ( ) ( ) *1 1= = , ,jj S j SS C j z V S S N S  − −     . 
From this we get ( ) ( ) *1jj S j Sz C j V S  = − −  , and we let 1n  denote the rank 
of the input-output matrix ( ) 1, ,j jj S j SY X S     of coalitions with the same 
excess value *1 . Then the other coalitions form a set denoted by 
( ) ( ) *2 1= , ,jj S j SS C j z V S S N S  − −      . Obviously, we have 
0 1 2 =   and  0 1 2 2= ,..., nS S − . 
Step 2: If 
1n m s= + , then the algorithm terminates and the optimal solution 
( )* * * *1 1 1 1, , , , , ,r i jw z r i j    is unique (the reason can be seen in Appendix 8). On the 
other hand, if 1n m s + , then go to step 3. 
Step 3: Let 1l l= +  and solve the following general model: 
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                  (17) 
  We get the optimal solution ( )* * * *, , , , , ,l lr li ljw z r i j    from model (17) and the set of 
17 
2 2l−  can be also divided into two subsets: 
  ( ) ( ) *2 1= = , , ,l j lj S j SS C j z V S S N S−   − −                  (18) 
  ( ) ( ) *2 , ,l j lj S j SS C j z V S S N S  = − −      .              (19) 
Then the rank of the input-output matrix ( ) 1 3 2 1, , ...j j lj S j SY X S −       
of coalitions with deterministic excess values from *1  to 
*
l  is denoted as ln . 
Step 4: If
ln m s= + , the algorithm terminates, and the optimal solution 
( )* * * *, , , , , ,l lr li ljw z r i j    is also unique. If ln m s + , then go to step 3 again. 
As discussed above, the nucleolus-based allocation plan maximizes the “degree of 
happiness” for coalitions of DMUs by the lexicographic order. More importantly, the 
nucleolus-based allocation plan first addresses the least happy coalition, aiming to 
maximize its “degree of happiness” on the fixed cost allocation results. Intuitively, 
favoring the least coalition is a generous philosophy and will cause less resistance in 
implementing the allocation plan in organizations. In such a way the acceptability of 
the resulted allocation plan will be improved, which will favor the decision maker’s 
effort in implementing the resulted allocation plan. By repeatedly maximizing the 
“degree of happiness” across all coalitions of DMUs, the decision maker will face the 
least difficulty and resistance to allocate the total fixed cost, and as a result it would 
be easier to completely allocate the total fixed cost of a common platform among its 
various users. 
4. Illustrative applications 
This section uses two datasets to illustrate the proposed cooperative game DEA 
approach, one is a dataset from Cook and Kress (1999) and the other is a real data of a 
steel and iron enterprise from China in 2015. 
4.1 A numerical example 
Table 1 shows the dataset from Cook and Kress (1999), and it has 12 DMUs and each 
DMU consumes 3 inputs to generate 2 outputs. The total fixed cost R=100 is to be 
allocated. Based on model (11), the maximal allocated cost each DMU can afford is 
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calculated and shown in the second column of Table 2. 
Table 1 A dataset from Cook and Kress (1999). 
DMU Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Output 1 Output 2 
1 350 39 9 67 751 
2 298 26 8 73 611 
3 422 31 7 75 584 
4 281 16 9 70 665 
5 301 16 6 75 445 
6 360 29 17 83 1070 
7 540 18 10 72 457 
8 276 33 5 78 590 
9 323 25 5 75 1074 
10 444 64 6 74 1072 
11 323 25 5 25 350 
12 444 64 6 104 1199 
Based on model (14), the optimal excess value is 326.1*1 = , and its corresponding 
coalition set is 
           1 1,7,8,9,11 , 5,7,9,11,12 , 3,4,6,7,8,10,12 , 2,3,4,6,7,10,12 , - 11N = , 
such that *
11.326,S S =   . The computation algorithm terminates, since 
( ) smMrank +== 5 , where ( ) 1, ,j jj S j SM Y X S   =   . Therefore, the fixed 
cost allocation can be determined as shown in the third column of Table 2, which is 
the nucleolus-based solution to the cooperative game ( ),N V . It is clear that the 
nucleolus-based solution shows a fairness concern by sympathizing and assisting 
vulnerable groups (i.e., the group has less excess value), thus the resulted allocation 
plan is of fairness. The calculation process of nucleolus-based allocation plan 
consistently sympathizes and assists vulnerable groups, thus the resulted allocation 
plan would be more acceptable and easily implemented in organizations in real 
managerial applications. In addition, the nucleolus-based allocation plan is very stable, 
and it is suitable for organizations consisting of a set of completing units. 
For the convenience of comparison, cost allocations based on Cook and Kress 
(1999), Beasley (2003), Li et al. (2013), and Du et al. (2014) are also given in the last 
four columns of Table 2. 
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First, the second column shows that upper bound of the fixed cost each DMU can 
afford is accepted by all approaches, except Cook and Kress (1999). The reason is that 
Cook and Kress (1999) belongs to the efficiency-invariance approach, while the 
others belongs or equals to the efficiency-maximization approach. The cost allocation 
based on Cook and Kress (1999) shows that the cost allocation may be entirely due to 
the input side, not depend on their outputs (Beasley, 2003). Readers can refer to two 
pairs of DMUs (DMU9 and DMU11, DMU10 and DMU12). This finding does not exist 
for other approaches. For example, our approach shows that DMU10 and DMU11 are 
allocated less cost than DMU12 and DMU9, respectively. 
Table 2 Fixed cost allocation results based on different approaches. 
DMU Upper 
bound 
Our 
approach 
Cook and 
Kress (1999) 
Beasley 
(2003) 
Li et al. 
(2013) 
Du et al. 
(2014) 
1 8.7859 7.27 14.52 6.78 6.38 5.79 
2 9.6907 7.61 6.74 7.21 7.42 7.95 
3 9.8192 6.57 9.32 6.83 6.68 6.54 
4 12.7309 8.77 5.6 8.47 8.83 11.10 
5 12.1649 6.99 5.79 7.08 7.63 8.69 
6 19.1686 11.50 8.15 10.06 9.70 13.49 
7 11.1340 4.63 8.86 5.09 4.28 7.10 
8 12.9434 7.89 6.26 7.74 8.35 6.83 
9 24.4768 14.05 7.31 15.11 15.87 16.68 
10 17.2763 9.77 10.08 10.08 9.75 5.42 
11 3.9468 1.33 7.31 1.58 0.46 0 
12 22.5158 13.63 10.08 13.97 14.64 10.41 
Compared with these efficiency-maximization approaches in Beasley (2003), Li et 
al. (2013) and Du et al. (2014), our approach has an advantage in reducing the 
absolute amount difference between the maximal and minimal cost among these 
DMUs, since 12.72 (=14.05-1.33) is less than 13.53, 15.41 and 16.68. As Li et al. 
(2009) suggested, a smaller gap among the allocated costs of DMUs will bring about 
less difficulty in implementing the allocation. 
It is noteworthy that the cost allocation based on Du et al. (2014) is one of multiple 
optimal allocations. The proposed approach in this paper considers cooperation and 
competition relations among DMUs, and uses the cooperative game to allocate the 
fixed cost. From the perspective of the game, the resulted cost allocation in this paper 
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may be more acceptable by DMUs as compared to other approaches.  
Table 3 Difference of five methods on three conditions. 
Conditions 
Methods 
O CK B L D 
Whether the method is linear? YES YES NO YES YES 
Whether the allocation is unique? YES YES YES YES NO 
Whether the method considers the game among 
DMUs. 
YES NO NO NO YES 
In order to observe the difference of the above five methods clearly, we further use 
Table 3 to describe different conditions that these methods satisfied: (1) whether the 
method is linear? (2) Whether the allocation is unique? (3) Whether the method 
considers the game among DMUs. From the results, we find that both Cook and Kress 
(1999), Beasley (2003) and Li et al. (2013) can determine a unique allocation, but the 
game among DMUs is not addressed, and even a series of nonlinear programming is 
used in Beasley (2003), which makes its allocation more complex. Only our proposed 
approach satisfies these three conditions simultaneously. 
4.2 A real application in a steel and iron enterprise 
A steel and iron company in Anhui Province China has ten production lines. Governed 
by the environmental and energy regulations, the firm faces enormous pressure to 
improve the structure of production and to enhance the efficiency of energy utilization. 
In 2015, the firm spent 20 million Yuan (RMB) to upgrade and retrofit some essential 
production equipment. Therefore, it requires its production lines to cover the total cost. 
In this application, each production line is considered as an independent and 
homogeneous DMU, which has four inputs (Standard coal, Iron ore, New water, and 
Labor) and two outputs (Production of steel and iron) as shown in Table 4. To offset 
the upgrade cost completely, here the fixed cost to be allocated is supposed to be 
R=2000 (unit: ten thousand Yuan (RMB)). 
Table 4 Input-output data of the steel and iron company. 
DMU Standard coal 
(ton) 
Iron ore 
(ton) 
New water 
(ton) 
Labor 
(person) 
Steel 
(ton) 
Iron 
(ton) 
1 74115 375944 2420 374 150236 41917 
2 84713 381974 3464 224 106177 68738 
3 76087 299056 2848 363 224356 42603 
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4 109150 420650 1645 397 133291 48536 
5 114462 356279 1661 324 301229 60390 
6 104493 427276 3024 356 200101 60148 
7 118825 392056 4220 351 253604 125641 
8 159620 283154 3136 290 160096 102599 
9 193873 391289 1976 341 160441 120832 
10 146680 278386 2246 442 97847 49659 
Similar to Section 4.1, we first solve model (11) and get the upper bound of 
allocated costs for all coalitions of DMUs. Here we show the upper bound for 
individual DMU in the second column in Table 5. Further, we use model (14) to 
maximize minimum excess values (i.e., the degree of happiness) among all coalitions 
of DMUs. Within the first round, we get the optimal objective function *1 42.9418 =  
for two coalitions  1,3,6,8,9  and  2,4,5,7,10 , and the corresponding allocation 
result and excess value for each individual DMU are given in the third and fourth 
columns of Table 5. Note that at this time it holds that 1 2 6n =  , thus we would turn 
into the second round. We directly solve model (17) and get the second minimum 
excess value *2 53.4210 =  for four coalitions, that is,  4,6,8 , 
 3,6,9,10 , 1,3,6,7,9,10  and  1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 . Now the equality 2 6=n m s= +  
holds, hence the algorithm terminates. As a result, the allocation derived from the 
second round was taken as the final nucleolus-based allocation of the upgrade costs, 
which is given in the last column of Table 5. 
Table 5 Fixed cost allocation results of the upgrade costs. 
DMU 
Upper 
bound 
Round 1 
Excess 
value 
Round 2 
Excess 
value 
Allocation 
1 201.8171 89.6874 112.1298 87.1106 114.7064909 87.1106 
2 262.3214 102.0070 160.3145 106.8298 155.4916676 106.8298 
3 400.8508 161.1517 239.6990 154.3165 246.5342492 154.3165 
4 170.7199 104.2614 66.4585 102.0796 68.64026791 102.0796 
5 572.2772 320.6585 251.6187 314.1732 258.1039762 314.1732 
6 261.0845 159.7399 101.3446 156.9450 104.139537 156.9450 
7 626.1986 389.9909 236.2077 400.4142 225.7844092 400.4142 
8 445.7973 269.6518 176.1455 273.6742 172.1231731 273.6742 
9 641.9022 342.8513 299.0509 351.0359 290.8663374 351.0359 
10 137.7383 60.0001 77.7382 53.4210 84.31727576 53.4210 
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According to the final optimal fixed cost allocation results, four production lines 
(DMU5, DMU7, DMU8, and DMU9) would need to pay much more than other 
production lines, and contribute more than two-third of the total costs. This could be 
due to the fact that these four production lines have a higher upper bound on possible 
allocated costs. On the contrary, DMU1, DMU4 and DMU10 are characterized with the 
lowest upper bound, so they afford the least upgrade costs as compared to its peers. 
Additionally, if we turn our attention to the operation size for these ten production 
lines, we can find that all production lines have very similar ranks in both overall size 
and allocated cost in ascending order, and even four of these ten production lines (3, 4, 
7 and 9) have identical ranks in both overall size and allocated cost, as shown in Table 
6. This fact implies that the allocation result derived from our proposed approach is 
implicitly consistent with the current input consumptions and output productions from 
a size point of view. That is to say, a DMU with larger scale is more likely to bear 
more cost, while less cost will be undertaken by DMUs with smaller sizes. This 
feature is an intuitive result and also demonstrates the validity of the proposed 
approach. 
Table 6 Operation sizes and allocated costs. 
DMU Input size Output size Overall size Rank  Allocated cost Rank 
1 0.0627 0.1043 0.0908 0.1080 0.0841 0.0581 0.0847 1 87.1106 2 
2 0.0717 0.1059 0.1300 0.0647 0.0594 0.0953 0.0878 2 106.8298 4 
3 0.0644 0.0829 0.1069 0.1049 0.1255 0.0591 0.0906 5 154.3165 5 
4 0.0923 0.1167 0.0617 0.1147 0.0746 0.0673 0.0879 3 102.0796 3 
5 0.0968 0.0988 0.0623 0.0936 0.1685 0.0838 0.1006 6 314.1732 8 
6 0.0884 0.1185 0.1135 0.1028 0.1120 0.0834 0.1031 7 156.9450 6 
7 0.1005 0.1087 0.1584 0.1014 0.1419 0.1742 0.1309 10 400.4142 10 
8 0.1350 0.0785 0.1177 0.0838 0.0896 0.1423 0.1078 8 273.6742 7 
9 0.1640 0.1085 0.0742 0.0985 0.0898 0.1676 0.1171 9 351.0359 9 
10 0.1241 0.0772 0.0843 0.1277 0.0547 0.0689 0.0895 4 53.4210 1 
* The size of a particular measure is calculated as the ratio of the measure value to 
the aggregated value across all production lines. The overall size is an arithmetic 
mean value across all measure sizes in the same row. 
5. Conclusions 
It is notable that the cooperation and competition relations among DMUs 
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simultaneously exist in allocating the fixed cost. This paper first finds that the novel 
game cross-efficiency approach of Du et al. (2014) is equivalent to the extended 
proportional sharing approach of Li et al. (2013). And both two approaches may give 
multiple cost allocations in the multi-dimensional case. This paper then considers the 
game relations in advance in the fixed cost allocation and proposes a cooperative 
game DEA approach. We define the super-additive characteristic function and adopts 
the nucleolus as a solution to the game. The resulted allocation scheme maximizes the 
“degree of happiness” of all coalitions through maximizing all excess values, which 
can be more acceptable to all DMUs. Finally, the proposed cooperative game DEA 
approach is illustrated with both a numerical example from previous literature and a 
real case of steel and iron enterprise from China. 
Future research may introduce the fairness criterion, and propose an approach 
based on trade-off between the efficiency and fairness criterion. Besides, one can 
explicitly take the operation size into account, and the generated allocation plan is 
proportional to input usages and output productions from a size point of view. 
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Appendix 1 
Theorem 1. Each fixed cost allocation under a common set of weights based on 
system (9) can satisfy the algorithm of the game cross-efficiency method. 
Proof. The cost allocation under a common set of weights is presented as 
1 1
11
1
,
0,
, 0, 0, ,
s m
j r rj i ijr i
n
j mj
j
r i m+
r u y v x j
r v R
r j
u v v r i .
= =
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= − 
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 
  
 
                                   (A1.1) 
  Let ( )1ˆ ˆ ˆ 1,...,j j mR r v j n+= =  be an allocation associated with ( )1ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,r i mu v v +  in 
(A1.1), and then ( )1 1ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,r i m j j mu v v R r v+ += is a feasible solution to model (4) (or linear 
model (5)), for it can satisfy all constraints of model (4), such that 
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1 1 1
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ˆ ˆ
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  ( )1 11 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ .
n n n
j j m j mj j j
R r v r v R+ += = == = =    
Hence, we have also ( )
1
1
1,
n
j jd
e e d j
n =
= =   and ( )* 1dE d = . It means that 
( )1 1ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,r i m j j mu v v R r v+ +=  is an optimal solution to model (4) and we cannot further 
improve the efficiency for any DMUj. Then for any smaller enough positive 0  , 
we have 1 0t tj je e 
+ − =  . The algorithm of cross-efficiency iterative method 
terminates. 
Note that ( )1 1ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,r i m j j mu v v R r v+ +=  is chosen randomly based on (A1.1), so any 
fixed cost allocation under a common set of weights based on system (9) can satisfy 
the algorithm of the cross-efficiency iterative method.  
Appendix 2 
Theorem 2. When the algorithm of the game cross-efficiency method terminates, the 
resulted fixed cost allocation can be generated based on system (9) under a common 
set of weights. 
Proof. It is proven by Du et al. (2014) that, when the cross-efficiency iterative 
algorithm terminates the optimal cross-efficiency for any DMUj equals one. Denote 
the optimal solution to the game cross-efficiency method as ( )* * * *1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,d d d dr i m ju v v r+ . 
Based on formula (7) we have 
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                               (A2.1) 
  Since the input-oriented d-cross-efficiency is no more than one, it must be that 
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                                     (A2.2) 
Then, * * *
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ˆ ˆ ˆ , , .
s md d d
j r rj i ijr i
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= −                          (A2.3) 
Further, we have 
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Let *
1
1
ˆ
n d
r rd
u u
n =
=   and *1
1
ˆ
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i id
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n =
=  , then we have system (A2.5). 
1 1
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      (A2.5) 
By combining system (A2.5) and the non-negative/positive constraints on variables, 
we get the same formulation as system (9). Therefore, when the cross-efficiency 
iterative algorithm terminates, the resulted final fixed cost allocation can be realized 
under a common set of weights based on system (9).   
Appendix 3 
Corollary 1. The optimal cost allocation of the game cross-efficiency method is 
equivalent to that of the extended proportional sharing method under a common set of 
weights based on system (9). 
Proof. It can be easily proven by combining theorems 1 and 2.   
Appendix 4 
Based on Corollary 1, all cost allocations based on Du et al. (2014) can be represented 
by system (9). And it can be transformed as follows: 
( ) 1 11 1 1 1 , 0.
s n m n
r rj i ij m mr j i j
R u y v x v v+ += = = == −                       (A4.1) 
In the one dimensional case, the allocation based on Formula (A4.1) is unique and 
the same as the standard proportional sharing method (Li et al., 2013; Si et al., 2013).  
In the general multi-dimensional case, however, the two approaches of Du et al. 
(2014) and Li et al. (2013) may give multiple allocations, since there exist 
( )1m s n+ + +  variables and ( )1+n  equations in system (9). Based on Li et al. 
(2013) and Si et al. (2013), we present Proposition 1 here to show the non-uniqueness. 
Proposition 1. According to the extended proportional sharing method based on 
system (9):  
(i) The unique allocation can be obtained if the cost allocation problem is a 
one-dimensional case in which only one output measure is considered, i.e., s=1 
and m=0; 
(ii) Multiple allocations may be available if and only if 1+ sm . 
Proposition 1 can be easily proven using basic results in linear algebra, and here we 
omit the proof.  
Appendix 5 
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Proposition 2. ( ) ( ) ( )0,
j S
V V N C j R

 = = − . 
Proof. The first part is held automatically. For the second part, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
j N j N
V N C j C S C j R
 
= − = −   .  
Appendix 6 
Theorem 3. The characteristic function V(S) satisfies the super-additivity property, 
i.e., we have ( ) ( ) ( )+V S V T V S T , if ,S T N and S T = . 
Proof. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
j S j T
V S V T C j C S C j C T
 
+ = − + −   
( ) ( ) ( )( )
j S T
C j C S C T

= − +  
  Based on the egoist’s dilemma in Nakabayashi and Tone (2006), we can find that 
the fixed allocation problem in model (11) would be sub-additive. That is, 
( ) ( ) ( )C S T C S C T +  for any ,S T N . As a result, we have 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
j S T
V S V T C j C S C T

+ = − +  
( ) ( )
j S T
C j C S T

 −  
( ) , ,V S T S T N S T=   = .  
Appendix 7 
Theorem 4. The cooperative game ( ),N V  is a balanced game. 
Proof. Consider a vector λ  with 2 2n −  nonnegative components ,S S N  , 
which satisfies that 1,Sj S N j N  =   . Then, according to Shapley (1967) the 
game ( ),N V  is said to be balanced if it holds ( ) ( )SS N V S V N  .  
According to model (11) and definition 1 on the characteristic function, we have 
  
30 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1,
1 1,
1,
max
max
max
r i
r i
r i
S SS N S N j S
s m
S r rj i ijS N j S r j S i j Sw
s m
S S r rj i ijS N j S S N r j S i j Sw
s
S S r rj i ijS N j S r j S j Sw
V S C j C S
C j y w x
C j y w x
C j y w x



 
 
  
  
  
  =  = 
   =  = 
  =  
 = −
 
 = − −
 
  = − −
   
  − −
 
  
     
      
    
( ) ( ) ( ) 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) 
( ) ( )
1
1 1,
1 1,
1,
max
max
max
r i
r i
r i
m
S N i
s m
S r S rj i S ijS N j S r S N j S i S N j Sw
s m
S r rj S i ij Sj N j S N r j N j S N i j N j S Nw
s
r rj i ij N r j Nw
C j y w x
C j y w x
C j y w x



   
   

 =
  =   =  
   =    =   
 = 
 
 
    = − −
     
   = − −
   
= − −
 
       
       
   ( ) ( ) ( )1 .
m
ji j N j N
C j R V S
=  
  = − =
   
  The above inequality is an immediate result of Nakabayashi and Tone’s (2006) 
egoist’s dilemma. 
Hence, the cooperative game ( ),N V  is a balanced game.  
Appendix 8 
Combine equations in system (9) and equation ( ) ( ) *1=jj S j SC j z V S  − −  , 
we have ( ) *1 1,r rj i ijr j S i j SC S y w x S   − = −      .            (A8.1) 
where 1 1,r r m i i mu v v w v + += = , and 1j j mR r v += . Apparently, it contains m s+  
variables ( ), , ,r iw r i  . If 1n m s= + , we have m s+  equations that are 
reciprocally linearly independent, then the unique solution can be obtained according 
to theories in Linear Algebra. Accordingly, the fixed cost allocation plan can be 
uniquely determined, and then the algorithm terminates. If 1n m s + , the rank of 
coefficient matrix is smaller than the number of variables. As a result, there still 
leaves flexibility in the variables, and we cannot terminate the algorithm but go to 
step 3. A similar situation occurs in step 4. If ln m s= + , then we get uniquely 
determined fixed cost allocation plan and terminate the algorithm, else do until there 
are m s+  linearly independent equations uniquely determining the variables and 
resulted allocation plan. 
